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WARNING ALL AUTHORS! YOUR "STYLE" MAY
INFRINGE YOUR OWN WORK: AUTHORS CAN
BENEFIT THROUGH LESS COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION
Anyone who listens to pop music will have no problem distinguish-
ing an ABBA song from one written by John Fogerty. Although both
works may be rock and roll songs, each has its own unique "sound."
Likewise, Ray Bradbury, Arthur C. Clarke and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.
may all write an identical science fiction tale as far as content is con-
cerned, yet each story will read differently. More importantly, any fan
familiar with these writers will have no trouble placing each work with
its corresponding author. The identifying element is what is known as
"style."
The "idea/expression" test in American copyright law forms a
roughly parallel concept to this "content/style" dichotomy. The rule is
that while ideas are not protectable under copyright, the expression of
ideas is protected.'
Under this rule, the songwriting style of an artist might be protected
as an expression of an idea. But if an artist wrote a song bearing his
unique style, assigned the song's copyright and then wrote another song
using the same style, could a court rule that the two songs had the same
expression? If so, the court might also rule that the artist infringed on
his own previously assigned work. A broad construction of "expression"
would limit the amount of work an artist with a unique style can produce
before infringing on previously assigned works.2 Ironically, authors
might actually be better off with less copyright protection. A rule with a
1. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
1977). This dichotomy was established by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Sel-
den, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). Selden invented a new system of bookkeeping, which he described in
"Selden's Condensed Ledger, or Book-keeping Simplified," a book for which he obtained a
copyright in 1859. The book contained sample ledger sheets to illustrate the system. Id. at 99-
100. The Supreme Court held that Selden's copyright could not bar others from copying the
ledger sheets if they were needed to utilize the system; otherwise, Selden would have a monop-
oly ownership over the system itself. This type of broad protection could only be secured, if at
all, through a patent. The only thing protected by Selden's copyright was his explanation of
the system. Id. at 102.
2. An artist who repeatedly engages the same style might do so either out of a desire to
express his work in a certain way, or because of a limited range of talent. Such situations have
been addressed by the courts in Esquire, Inc. v. Varga Enter., 81 F. Supp. 306, 307-08 (N.D.
Ill. 1948) (painter); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950
(9th Cir. 1954) (writer).
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narrow scope of copyright protection would allow anyone, including the
original artist, to recreate the artist's "style" without danger of infringing
on an earlier work, because a greater degree of similarity would be re-
quired between the two expressions for an infringement.
THE Hypos COME To LIFE IN FANTASY V. FOGERTY
In Fantasy v. Fogerty,3 Fantasy, Inc. sued singer-songwriter John
Fogerty for infringing the copyright to "Run From The Jungle" ("Jun-
gle"), a song which Fogerty had written.4  Fogerty wrote "Jungle" in
1970. He then granted exclusive rights5 to the copyright to Fantasy's
predecessors, Cicero Music and Galaxy Records.6 In 1984, Fogerty
wrote the song "The Old Man Down The Road" 7 ("Old Man"). He
registered the song for copyright and authorized Warner Brothers
Records, Inc. ("Warner Bros.") to distribute phonorecords of his per-
formance of "Old Man." 8 Fantasy claimed "Old Man" was the same
song as "Jungle," only with new lyrics.9 Fantasy brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
charging Fogerty and Warner Bros. with copyright infringement.10
One of Fogerty's defenses was that the first amendment" protected
3. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Fantasy I"). This suit
is yet another in a long round of disputes between John Fogerty and Fantasy owner Saul
Zaentz. In 1985, Zaentz filed a $142,000,000 suit against Fogerty in Los Angeles Superior
Court, alleging that he was libeled by two songs on Fogerty's "Centerfield" album, "Zanz
Kant Danz" and "Mr. Greed." That case has not gone to trial. J. Harwood, Fogerty Demon-
stration Lends Credence To Claim On Music, Daily Variety, Nov. 1, 1988, at 10, col. 4-5
[hereinafter Daily Variety, Nov. 1, 1988]. Creedence Clearwater Revival, Fogerty's former
group, also filed a suit against a Bahama bank, naming Zaentz as a codefendant. Zaentz suc-
ceeded in showing he had nothing to do with the bank and sued Fogerty for malicious prosecu-
tion. His suit was dismissed from Los Angeles Superior Court but an appeal is now pending.
Id. at 10, col. 5.
4. Fantasy I, 664 F. Supp. at 1347.
5. "Exclusive rights" in a copyrighted work include the right to: reproduce it in copies or
phonorecords; to make derivative works based upon it; to distribute copies of it; to perform it
in public; to display it in public; and to authorize anyone else to exercise any of these rights.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). A "phonorecord" is any material object, now known or later devel-
oped, in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, are fixed and from which they can be perceived, reproduced or communicated, either
directly or through the use of a machine. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
6. Fantasy I4 664 F. Supp. at 1347.
7. "Old Man Down The Road" was included on the "Centerfield" album. Daily Variety,
Nov. 1, 1988, supra note 3, at 3, col. 2.
8. Fantasy I4 664 F. Supp. at 1347.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
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his songwriting "style" and that a finding of infringement would impair
his ability to earn a livelihood. 2 Fogerty claimed that "Old Man" was
written in his general style' 3 and that many of his songs were musically
alike. "4
Fogerty sought summary judgment on the issues of the first amend-
ment protection of songwriting style and of fair use. 5 The court held
that the "idea/expression" dichotomy of the substantial similarity test
adequately served the competing interests of copyright and the first
amendment and that disputed issues of material fact existed concerning
the fair use defense.' 6 The court denied Fogerty summary judgment on
both counts.
1 7
Warner Bros. responded with a motion for summary judgment."'
Warner Bros. claimed that because the legal co-owners of a copyright
cannot bring an infringement suit against each other, a legal owner and a
beneficial owner of a copyright cannot bring a suit against each other.19
Since Fogerty was the beneficial owner of the copyright to "Jungle," he
could not be sued by Fantasy, the legal owner. The court dismissed this
argument, stating that a beneficial owner had an economic interest in the
copyright, but no right to use or license the use of the copyright.2 °
Therefore, Fogerty could infringe upon "Jungle" in the same manner as
anyone else, and Fantasy had standing to sue him.2'
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. Fantasy I, 664 F. Supp. at 1351.
13. Legal Briefs, The Hollywood Reporter, Oct. 28, 1988, at 16, col. 3.
14. J. Harwood, Fogerty Up Against Himself In Trial, Daily Variety, Oct. 27, 1988, at 16,
col. 3. John Fogerty has written many tunes in what he calls his "swamp rock" repertoire. An
expert witness for Fogerty, Harold Barlow, testified that "Mr. Fogerty has made this structure
commonplace," and that the riffs found in both "Jungle" and "Old Man" repeatedly show up
in Fogerty tunes going back to "Bootleg" in 1968 (written before either of the songs at issue).
Id. at 16, col. 4-5.
15. Fantasy I, 664 F. Supp. at 1347. Fair use is a common law doctrine which grants a
limited privilege to those other than the copyright owner to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without the owner's consent. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir.
1986). Congress codified the doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982),
but the codification was only a listing of some nonexclusive factors for courts to consider.
Congress's express intent was to leave the courts free to adapt the doctrine to new situations as
they arose. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 435.
16. Fantasy II, 664 F. Supp. at 1350-51.
17. Id.
18. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 654 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Fantasy I").
19. Id. at 1131. A "beneficial owner" of a copyright is an author who has parted with
legal title to the copyright in exchange for percentage royalties based on sales or license fees.
20. Id.
21. Id. After this setback, Warner Bros. moved for reconsideration, arguing that Fantasy
was not the legal owner of the "Jungle" copyright because of a broken link in Fantasy's chain
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Fantasy sought summary judgment on the issue of copyright in-
fringement.22 The court denied the motion,23 and the case proceeded to
trial, where the jury found that "Old Man" did not infringe the copyright
to "Jungle."24 Judge Samuel Conti did not write an opinion for the case.
Juror Ed Wilson said that the general feeling on the panel was that while
"superficial similarities" existed between the two songs, they lacked the
"substantial similarities" which the law required for infringement.25
Thus, Fogerty won on the basis of traditional copyright law.
However, Wilson went on to say that "even if the similarities be-
tween the songs were substantial, he and the other jurors did not think
Fogerty could copy from himself."' 26 Unfortunately, the remarks of ju-
rors do not establish new rules of law. The following material demon-
strates that courts are more prepared to find an artist liable for
infringement when that artist produces a second work "substantially sim-
ilar" to his or her own previous work.
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE POLICY OF LIMITED PROTECTION
The Copyright Act of 1976 protects "original works of author-
ship."27 In the context of copyright law, "original" means that the work
of title. Fantasy II, 664 F. Supp. at 1355. However, the court ruled that Fantasy had estab-
lished its chain of title to the copyright and could proceed with its infringement claim. Id. at
1349.
22. Fantasy I1, 664 F. Supp. at 1353. To establish a successful copyright infringement
claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of the copyright, and (2) copying of protectable
expression by the defendant. Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 346 (1987). But because direct evidence of copying is rarely available, a
plaintiff may establish copying by the circumstantial evidence of (1) the defendant's access to
the copyrighted work, and (2) a substantial similarity in both the general ideas and the expres-
sion of the two works. Baxter, 812 F.2d at 423. Fantasy had to prove Fogerty's access to
"Jungle" and the existence of a substantial similarity in both the ideas and the expression of
the two songs. No bright line rule exists as to what constitutes substantial similarity. Nimmer
has stated that determining the extent of similarity needed to constitute a substantial similarity
is one of the most difficult questions in copyright law and the one least given to helpful general-
izations. Somewhere between the opposite extremes of no similarity and complete similarity
lies the boundary line of substantial similarity. 3 M. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], at
13-20 (1988). Judge Learned Hand has pointed out that the line delineating substantial simi-
larity will seem arbitrary wherever it is drawn. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119,
122 (2d Cir. 1930). John Fogerty had access to "Jungle" since he had written it. The court
found, however, that reasonable minds could differ as to whether a substantial similarity be-
tween "Jungle" and "Old Man" existed. Fantasy 1, 664 F. Supp. at 1350.
23. Fantasy AI, 664 F. Supp. at 1350.
24. Fantasy v. Fogerty, No. C85-4929 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 1988) ("Fantasy III").
25. J. Harwood, Jury Clears Fogerty Of Plagiarism Charge, Daily Variety, Nov. 8, 1988, at
18, col. 2 [hereinafter Daily Variety, Nov. 8, 1988].
26. Id.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
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"owes its origin" to the author,2" and "means little more than a prohibi-
tion of actual copying."2 9 The Copyright Act does not require novelty to
secure copyright protection for a work.3° For example, two independent
creators of identical maps may each obtain exclusive rights to make a
copy of his own map, and neither will infringe the other's copyright.
Originality, rather than the higher standard of novelty, is all that is
required.
Accordingly, in Gross v. Seligman,3 the court found that if two art-
ists choose to photograph the same model and, by chance, the same pose,
background, light and shade make it difficult to distinguish the second
photograph from the first photograph, the second photograph will not
infringe the first because it is not a copy of the first.
3 2
Limitations on the scope of copyright protection are founded upon
the policy voiced by Lord Mansfield.3 3 We want to secure to "men of
ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community
* . .their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour...
[balanced against the consideration that] .. .the world may not be de-
prived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.,
34
These two goals, rewarding the author and making their works
available to the public, are not mutually exclusive. The Constitution
specifies that "[t]o Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"
Congress shall have the power to secure "for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries."' 35 The Supreme Court has ruled that the "economic philoso-
phy" behind this clause is that the best way to advance the public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors is to encourage their indi-
vidual efforts through the financial reward that comes to them from
copyright and patent protection. 36 However, rewarding owners is a sec-
28. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
29. Id. at 103.
30. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
31. Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
32. Id. at 931.
33. Lord William Murray Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice of England during the latter half
of the 18th century, is possibly best remembered for his statement to the effect that "Possession
is very strong; rather more than nine points of the law." Corporation of Kingston-upon-Hull
v. Homer, 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 815 (1774) (reprinted in J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY
3 (1st ed. 1981)).
34. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 63 (3d Cir. 1978),
citing Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 (K.B. 1801), quoting Lord Mansfield in Sayre
v. Moore (Hil. 1785).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
36. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
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ondary consideration." The scope of copyright protection must not ex-
pand to the extent that it strangles rather than encourages future artistic
efforts. To do so would be a flagrant violation of the constitutional man-
date behind copyright protection.
For instance, a more expansive copyright protection than the court
allowed in Gross might mean that a second photographer would not be
able to take a photograph of the original model, or one resembling the
original model, or even a photograph of any model whatsoever, depend-
ing on how broadly the definition of protectable expression was
construed.
METHODS OF LIMITING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Merger Doctrine
To avoid restrictions on future works of authorship, and the result-
ing constraints on free speech, the courts have established the "idea/ex-
pression" dichotomy as an important policy limitation on the scope of
copyright protection.3"
However, as Judge Hand observed, no clear demarcation exists "as
to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea' and has bor-
rowed its 'expression.' "" In some cases, an idea merges with its expres-
sion when the idea is so narrow that only a few ways exist to express the
idea,' or even no other way of expressing it." Although the expression
contains original authorship, to protect the expression under copyright
would prevent others from expressing the same idea. Under the Merger
Doctrine, when such merger takes place, copyright protection is
denied.42
The Merger Doctrine was applied in Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble
Co.43 The court denied copyright protection to a set of contest rules.
Though the rules were an expression rather than an idea, the court deter-
mined that only a limited number of ways existed to state the simple
37. Id. In an earlier Supreme Court decision regarding the copyright monopoly granted
by Congress to authors, Chief Justice Hughes stated: "The sole interest of the United States
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
38. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir.
1977). The "idea/expression" dichotomy explained supra note 1.
39. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
40. Such as a simple set of contest rules. See infra note 44.
41. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
42. Id
43. 379 F.2d 675 (lst Cir. 1967).
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rules." Copyright protection would bar anyone else from holding a simi-
lar contest because no one would be able to express the rules to the con-
testants. The policy behind the Merger Doctrine forbids monopolization
of subject matter by the copyrighting of its expression.45
Scenes a Faire
Schwarz v. Universal Pictures" introduced the doctrine of scenes a
faire as a further limitation on the scope of copyright protection.47 A
scene a faire is a scene which is inherent in a story's subject matter and,
therefore, cannot be avoided by any author who chooses to write about
that subject.4" A second author cannot infringe even if he recreates ex-
actly the first author's expression if that expression is composed of stock
scenes that flow inevitably from common unprotectable ideas. To hold
otherwise would give the first author a monopoly on commonplace
ideas.49 The policy behind scenes a faire and the Merger Doctrine is the
same.5" Both doctrines deny protection to expression if it would mean
granting a monopoly over an idea.
WHEN AN AUTHOR INFRINGES HIs OWN WORK
Copyright protection is limited by the policy not to restrict the crea-
tion of future works of authorship. Paradoxically, some authors benefit
when the scope of copyright protection is narrowed. Such limitations
allow authors the freedom to explore ideas already expressed in works by
previous authors, or in their own previous works in which they have as-
44. Id. at 678.
45. Id. at 678-79.
46. 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
47. 3 M. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], at 13-32 (1988), citing Schwarz, 85 F. Supp.
270 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
48. Schwarz 85 F. Supp. at 275-76. There may only be about three dozen basic dramatic
situations "which form the stuff of drama." Id at 275. Such "fundamental plot[s]" are com-
mon property and cannot be protected under copyright. Id. Compulsory truth-telling by
means of a bet is one such fundamental idea. Id.
49. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.
1984).
50. In a story about American slavery, scenes a faire would include "[a]ttempted escapes,
flights through the woods pursued by baying dogs, the sorrowful or happy singing of slaves."
Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Also "sex between male slave
owners and female slaves and the resentment of the female slave owners... the sale of a slave
child away from her family and the attendant agonies.. . the horror of punitive mutilation...
slave owners complaining about the high price of slaves." Id. at 45 n.7. A story about the
destruction of the Hindenburg dirigible would include such scenes afaire as "the airship's crew
engag[ing] in revelry [in a German beer hall] prior to the voyage ... common German greet-
ings of the period, such as 'Heil Hitler,' or songs, such as the German National anthem."
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980).
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signed the copyrights. A narrower scope of copyright protection allows
them to come closer to previous expressions without infringing them.
Courts apply the "idea/expression" dichotomy rule identically to an
author accused of infringing another's work as to an author accused of
infringing his or her own (assigned) work.51 While the test is the same,
the burden of proof seems to be heavier on the "self-infringer" because of
the increased difficulty in proving that a work is original if the author has
already created a previous work very much like the work in question.
For instance, in Gross, the court held that if a second artist created a
photograph nearly indistinguishable from a photograph made by the first
artist, the second photograph would not constitute infringement so long
as it came from the second artist's own conception.52 The first artist
risked competition from a second-comer by choosing to create a picture
of an already existing model.53 The facts in Gross concerned only one
artist, who had taken a photograph of a model whom he had pose in a
certain way.54 He assigned the copyright to the photograph. Two years
later, the same artist took another photograph of the same model, posed
in an identical way, but with some small variations. The court found
that the second photograph infringed the copyright of the first.5 Signifi-
cantly, "the identity of the artist" was one of the factors which the court
weighed heavily in reaching its decision.56 The court thought it was
likely that the artist had copied the first photograph because he himself
had taken it. 7
If another artist creates a photograph nearly indistinguishable from
the original, the courts assume that the work came from his or her own
conception. But the original artist who creates the original work, and
assigns the copyright to it, must not repeat himself. Other artists may
echo the original work to a degree denied to its original creator.
5 1. See generally Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 64-67. An artist assigned the copyright to his
painting of a cardinal. Afterwards he created a similar painting of a cardinal. In the copyright
infringement suit which followed, the sole determining issue was whether the artist had copied
his first painting in creating his second. His previous access to his first work, and the similarity
between the two paintings, was circumstantial evidence of copying, but was not conclusive. Id.
at 66. "[Ain artist is free to consult the same source for another original painting." Id. at 65.
52. Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 932.
56. Id. at 931. "The identity of the artist ... indicate[s] very strongly that the first picture
was used to produce the second." Id.
57. Gross, 212 F. at 931. "The one thing, viz., the exercise of artistic talent, which made
the first photographic picture a subject of copyright, has been used not to produce another
picture, but to duplicate the original." Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 9
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A rationale for this state of affairs may lie in the rule that to infringe
a copyright, the infringer must copy a protectable expression owned by
someone else. 58 Because direct evidence of actual copying is rarely avail-
able, copying can be inferred by access to the copyrighted work and the
substantial similarity between the two works.59 Access can be inferred
by circumstantial evidence.' But where proof of access is clear and con-
vincing, rather than merely shown by the preponderance of the evidence,
"the required degree of similarity may be somewhat less than would be
necessary in the absence of such proof."61 The stronger the proof of ac-
cess, the less similarity needed to find infringement.62
"Copying done from memory is as objectionable as that done by
tracing or direct view"63 and the original author is in the best position to
remember his own previous work. Thus, one of the best proofs of access
to an original work is when the accused infringer is the original author.
This strong showing of access places the original author under a heavier
burden of proof than that placed on a second author, to show that there
is no substantial similarity between his new work and his original (as-
signed) work.
Nevertheless, some cases have reached more favorable results for
original artists. In Franklin Mint v. National Wildlife Art Exchange"4
the court faced an artist who painted a picture of two cardinals. He sold
the work and then painted another picture of two cardinals. As in Gross,
the artist in Franklin Mint used some of the same source material
(sketches, photographs, slides, etc.), as well as some new source material,
for his second painting as for the first.65 The court found that the artist's
second work had not infringed upon the copyright of the first.66
The outcome in Franklin Mint differed from that of Gross in that the
Franklin Mint court recognized the need not to restrict the progress of
the arts by broadening the scope of copyright protection for past works.6
7
The opinion favors giving artists ample room to express themselves in
new works and leaves them free to consult the same source for another
58. Baxter, 812 F.2d at 423.
59. Fantasy II 664 F. Supp. at 1348.
60. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162.
61. Id. at 1172.
62. Id.
63. Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 63-64 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
64. Id. at 62.
65. Id. at 64.
66. Id. at 67.
67. Id at 66. The court agreed with the defendant's argument that "freedom... must be
extended to artists to utilize basic subject matter more than once." Id.
1989]
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painting, just as others are free to copy the original subject matter.68 An
element of scenes a faire was also factored into the decision. Expert testi-
mony stated that conventions in ornithological art tended to limit nov-
elty in the depiction of birds.69
More importantly, the court recognized that some painters repeat-
edly return to the same basic themes.7" Furthermore, an artist's copying
of his own work might not be enough to constitute infringement. The
degree of substantial similarity needed to prove infringement is greater
than the degree needed to show mere copying. If an ordinary lay person
would be able to distinguish between the two works, there would be no
infringement even if there had been some copying.71
The court noted that the difficulty inherent in marking the boundary
between idea and expression was compounded by applying the same gen-
eral principles to claims involving plays, novels, sculptures, maps, infor-
mational directories, musical compositions and artistic paintings.72
However, "[ilsolating the idea from the expression and determining the
extent of copying required ... [to constitute unlawful appropriation de-
pended] .. .to some degree on whether the subject matter is words or
symbols written on paper, or paint brushed onto canvas."
73
DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR DIFFERENT MEDIA
Factual Expressions
A stricter standard of similarity is required where the subject matter
of the copyrighted work is factual rather than purely artistic. In Ricker
v. General Electric,74 an author wrote a book on radio communications in
68. Id. at 65.
69. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 66. "For example, minute attention to detail of plumage
and other physical characteristics is required and the stance of the birds must be anatomically
correct." Id
70. Id. at 66. Judge Weis equated themes with ideas rather than expressions, and hence
themes were not copyrightable. Id.
71. Id at 65-66.
72. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 65. In Mazer, Supreme Court Justice Douglas noted in a
separate opinion that items which have been copyrighted include
statuettes, book ends, clocks, lamps, door knockers, candlesticks, inkstands, chande-
liers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and pepper shakers, fish bowls, casseroles and ash
trays. Perhaps these are all "writings" in the constitutional sense. But to me, at
least, they are not obviously so . . . I would accordingly put the case down for
reargument.
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 221.
73. Id. (emphasis added). Although nothing in the opinion clarifies what Judge Weis had
in mind when contrasting "words" with "symbols," it is possible that musical notes may qual-
ify here.
74. 162 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1947).
[Vol. 9
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simple language comprehensible to lay readers."' The author submitted
her work to General Electric for publication. General Electric refused
her offer and published its own radio communications book targeted to
the nontechnical employees of the radio industry.76 The author sued,
alleging "plagiarism of scientific materials simply prepared for the lay
reader."7 7
The court found that although General Electric did have access to
the plaintiff's book, the evidence showed no proof of copying and that
General Electric had based most of its own book on its own pre-existing
material.78
However, the court went further in stating that the plaintiff had no
monopoly on the scientific information contained in her book, and did
not have a monopoly on "the idea of expounding such information in
simple language comprehensible to lay readers."' 79 In other words, the
court classified the style of her writing as an unprotectable idea rather
than as a protectable expression.
The court also held that the nature of the work must be considered
when determining whether or not a work has been plagiarized."0 Where
access is proven, similarities between the copyrighted work and the al-
leged piracy may create an inference of plagiarism. But such an infer-
ence is notably diminished when the similarities relate "to the expression
of scientific principles which must necessarily be stated in more or less
stereotyped language."81 The policy is similar to that of Merger, in that
copyright protection is not extended to the expression of certain scientific
facts because the facts involved can only be expressed in a limited
fashion.
The rule of limiting the copyright protection afforded to the style
used in the expression of factual material was reaffirmed more recently in
McMahon v. Prentice-Hall.82 In McMahon, the plaintiff professor wrote
three editions of a college level introductory psychology textbook as well
as one edition for another textbook, which were published by Prentice-
Hall. Later Prentice-Hall also published three editions of a college level
introductory psychology textbook written by Professor Morris. Profes-
sor McMahon claimed that both Prentice-Hall and Professor Morris had
75. Id. at 142. The plaintiff author titled her book "Radio Primer."
76. Id at 142-43. General Electric's book was called "The ABC's of Radio."
77. Id. at 142.
78. Id. at 143.
79. Ricker, 162 F.2d at 142.
80. Id
81. Id.
82. 486 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
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infringed the copyrights to his respective works.8 3
The court found it unclear which elements of Morris' books the
plaintiff claimed had infringed his copyrights.84 In holding for the de-
fendants, the court found the similarity of the works' subject matter in-
sufficient for a finding of infringement.8 5 Second, the court analyzed the
style in which the books were written and decided that Morris had fol-
lowed McMahon's style to a large extent, in spite of some differences.86
Presented as a question of fact, a jury might conclude that Morris had
adopted the writing style McMahon had used first.8 7
However, this question of fact alone could not preclude the court
from granting defendant summary judgment because such a finding
would not amount to copyright infringement.88 The court went on to
construe Ricker as holding that "[a] writer may not claim a monopoly on
a particular writing style by virtue of a copyright.
89
The court also held that an author cannot obtain a copyright on
ideas, concepts or theories." McMahon argued that he was "the first
author to treat certain subjects in a particular way or to analyze concepts
to reach the results contained in his books."'" The court, however, could
not distinguish his "treatment" or "analysis" from his "theories, ideas,
concepts, or style of writing."92 Regarding the style used to express fac-
tual material, the court held that style belonged in the category of unpro-
tectable items.93
Artistic Expressions
The same analysis used to determine whether the copyright to a fac-
tual work is infringed is also applied to artistic works. The court in
Franklin Mint held that "the ease with which a copyright may be deline-
83. Id. at 1298.
84. Id. at 1302.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. McMahon, 486 F. Supp. at 1302. McMahon's textbook was written in the first person
"in a light and easily readable style." He used colloquialisms and examples which the young
people to whom his book was directed could easily relate to. Morris followed this style to a
large extent, though he wrote in the third person. Morris, like McMahon, designed his books
to hold the reader's interest and attention, rather than offering a mere recital of dry facts. Id.
88. Id at 1302. The court reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that it accepted
McMahon's "assertion that he was the first author of such textbooks to depart from the dry
and serious tone previously employed." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1303.
91. Id.
92. McMahon, 486 F. Supp. at 1303.
93. Id. at 1302.
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ated may depend on the artist's style."94 An artist who creates an im-
pressionist painting will have a broader scope of protection than one who
creates paintings with a photograph-like clarity. Such a copyright "may
be termed 'weak'" because of the difficulty in proving, in the case of a
realist painting, that a second artist who paints a similar work has copied
the first painting rather than the actual subject matter.95 Thus, how ac-
curately a painting attempts to mirror reality is a factor in deciding
whether an artist has infringed a previous work.
96
SELF-INFRINGEMENT OF NON-FACTUAL WORKS
The above cases show the increased difficulty of infringing on a
work depicting facts as opposed to a work of pure fiction or abstraction,
regardless of whether the medium of expression is literary97 or visual.98
The burden of proving that a new work is not a copy of a previous work
is heavier if the author of both works is the same,99 but the rule is the
same. Infringement is found only if the court believes that the second
work was a copy of the first, because authors remain free to create new
works based on the original subject matter."°
Because of the limited ways of expressing facts, different works ex-
pressing the same fact must necessarily be similar to each other. The
courts recognize this and have accordingly granted a narrower scope of
copyright to factual works than to purely artistic works."0 ' Thus, an
author of a factual work can more easily claim that his work was based
on the subject matter itself rather than on a previous factual work.
Conversely, the greater number of ways in which fictional or ab-
stract10 2 works can be expressed results in increased difficulty for the art-
ist of such a work to prove that the new work originated with her rather
than having been copied.
94. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 65.
95. Id.
96. Id. "A scientific drawing of a bird must necessarily be more similar to another of the
same nature than it would be to an abstract version of the creature in flight." Id.
97. Ricker, 162 F.2d 141; McMahon, 486 F. Supp. 1296.
98. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d 62.
99. See generally Gross, 212 F. at 931.
100. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 65.
101. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 65; Ricker, 162 F.2d at 142.
102. For purposes of this casenote, the term "abstract" is used broadly to mean a work that
does not depict reality in an accurate manner, such as an impressionist painting as opposed to
a realist painting, or a photograph.
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Visual Style
When an artist repeatedly engages in a particular style of expression,
either because of a desire to express his work in a certain way, or because
of a limited range of talent, he will produce works of inevitable similarity
to each other. Such artists need a narrow scope of copyright protection,
otherwise, once they assign a work, the assignee could very well claim
that any of the artists' subsequent works are infringements of the as-
signed work. Fortunately, some authority in this area is favorable to
artists.
In Esquire v. Varga Enterprises,1"3 Esquire Magazine hired Alberto
Vargas to create paintings for use in its magazine and in its annual calen-
dar."° Esquire became the owner of the copyrights to all of the paint-
ings which Vargas produced under his contract with the magazine. The
contract expired in 1943, but a new one was signed in 1944. In 1946,
Vargas repudiated his contract with Esquire and published calendars fea-
turing his new paintings. 105
Esquire sued Vargas, alleging that four of the paintings in his calen-
dar were copied from paintings that Vargas had previously submitted to
Esquire and to which Esquire owned the copyright. 106
The court held for Vargas on the issue of copyright infringement. 107
It based part of its decision not on the lack of similarity among the paint-
ings, but rather on the consistent similarities which existed throughout
all of Vargas' paintings.10 8 The court stated:
Any attempt to point out the distinguishing elements of the
various paintings should be prefaced by the observation that
the over one hundred paintings by defendant in evidence reveal
that defendant's artistic talent is limited to the portrayal of the
female figure in varying degrees of undress. His success in this
line of endeavor can undoubtedly be attributed to the remarka-
103. 81 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
Originally, the pictures furnished bore defendant's name or signature, 'Vargas', and
were reproduced and published with his name thereon. Later by agreement of the
parties, the name 'Vargas' was changed to 'Varga'. Thereafter, the pictures created
by defendant and published by plaintiff were called 'Varga Girls', and the name of
the defendant appearing thereon was 'A. Varga' with a small 'Esq.' inserted in the
large lower loop of the letter 'g' of the name.
Id. at 307. This explains the discrepancy between the spelling used in the defendant's name,
and the spelling used in the case name.
104. Id. at 307.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Esquire, 81 F. Supp. at 309.
108. Id. at 307-08.
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ble physical characteristics of his finished product, e.g., the ex-
aggerated torso and the subtly curved but unduly long legs. It
is apparent from the testimony that this is all he has ever drawn
and seems to be all he ever will draw. It follows, therefore, that
all his future drawings will bear some similarity to his previous
work, whether or not his past creations are before him at the
time he is painting. He has a certain type of art in mind and,
consequently, that is all he is able to express on the drawing
board. It can be seen, therefore, that if the first painting sub-
mitted by him to the plaintiff could properly be considered a
work of creative art, his subsequent paintings should probably
be accorded a similar status.' ° 9
The consistent similarities in Vargas's paintings convinced the court
that each painting was independently created, rather than copied. But
the court added that, in any event, it was
possible to detect a sufficient number of elements of distinction
between the original and the accused drawings to remove the
latter from the category of copied work. Although it is cer-
tainly not decisive, it should be noted for the record that the
articles of "clothing" (this term is used euphemistically, for
said articles are about as concealing as the ordinary window
pane) vary from picture to picture." °
Literary Style
Factual works are narrowly protected under copyright because only
a limited number of ways exist to express a fact."' The style of expres-
sion falls outside of protectability.
109. Id at 307-08 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 308. Judge Campbell went on to compare the distinctions between each of the
four sets of paintings in question. For example, between one set of paintings his examination
found that
(a) Hair-Accused's hair is long and gathered at the base of the neck; Original's is
combed upward to the top of the head in the well-known "upsweep" coiffure;
(b) Face-Original faces almost directly away from the observer; Accused's head is
turned more to the right, thereby revealing a greater portion of the cheek, eyebrow
and eyelash; (c) Left hand-Original's ring and little fingers are curled under the
palm; Accused's hand is spread out in a virtually flat position; (d) Right leg--Origi-
nal's is held out straight from the body; Accused's is bent approximately 45 degrees
at the knee; (e) Left leg-Original's is invisible; Accused's left foot is visible;
(f) Body position-Accused appears to be in a more upright position which accord-
ingly raises the left shoulder considerably above the right, whereas Original's shoul-
ders are in almost a perfectly horizontal plane.
Id.
111. Franklin Mint. 575 F.2d at 65.
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The Esquire court applied this principle to the style of expression
used in purely artistic visual works. The court reasoned that the limited
avenues of expression available to Vargas created a presumption that the
artist had originated the works in question, rather than copied them from
his previous works.
This reasoning has also been applied to fictitious literary works. In
Warner Brothers Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System," 2 Warner
accused Dashiell Hammett of infringing the copyright to "The Maltese
Falcon. "113 Hammett had written "The Maltese Falcon" and had sold
the exclusive motion picture, television and radio rights to Warner Bros.
in 1930.14 In 1946, Hammett granted to third parties the motion pic-
ture, television and radio rights to use his characters from "The Maltese
Falcon" in all future (non-"Maltese Falcon") adventures.I 5
Though the court held for Hammett on a contract theory, 1 6 it also
held that Congress did not intend to protect characters with their names
under the copyright statute.'1 7 The court equated characters with such
unprotectables as style, idea, theme or theory. Even if Hammett had
assigned his complete rights in the copyright to "The Maltese Falcon,"
the characters were merely "vehicles for the story told, and vehicles did
not go with the sale of the story.""' Since characters were not protect-
able under copyright," 9 either Hammett or another author could write
stories using the same characters without infringing anyone's copyright.
An Economic Argument
Warner Bros. also offered an economic argument for refusing to ex-
tend the scope of copyright protection to characters.
Authors work for the love of their art no more than other pro-
fessional people work in other lines of work for the love of it.
There is the financial motive as well. The characters of an au-
112. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
113. Id. at 948.
114. Id. at 946-48.
115. Id. at 948.
116. Id. at 949-50. Hammett won under the doctrine of ejusdem generis. Under this theory
of construction, where general language follows specific language, the general language is con-
strued as only referring to the specific which came before it. Hammett's contract with Warner
Bros. specifically granted to Warner Bros. the title of "The Maltese Falcon" but did not specif-
ically grant characters. "The clearest language is necessary to divest the author of the fruits of
his labor. Such language is lacking here." Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 949.
117. Id. at 950.
118. Id.
119. Though characters are not protectable under copyright in the Ninth Circuit, they may
still be protected under trademark theories. Id. at 951.
[Vol. 9
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
thor's imagination and the art of his descriptive talent, like a
painter's or like a person with his penmanship, are always lim-
ited and always fall into limited patterns. The restriction ar-
gued for [by Warner Bros.] is unreasonable, and would effect
the very opposite of the statute's purpose which is to encourage
the production of the arts.
120
The court recognized that the economic policy behind copyright law
would be defeated by broadening the scope of protection. Too broad a
scope would result in denying authors an economic livelihood and deny-
ing the world the benefits of their endeavors.12" '
Musical Style
The same principles used to separate idea from expression are ap-
plied to significantly different media in attempting to determine the ex-
tent of copying needed for unlawful appropriation. However, the court
in Franklin Mint held that whether a painting's style was realist or ab-
stract had to be considered in infringement cases because of the unequal
restrictions imposed in each case.122
The same general principles used to determine the issue of infringe-
ment in visual and literary works also apply to musical compositions. 1
23
While lyrics can tell a factually true story, all musical notes are abstract.
Thus it would seem that musical compositions should be afforded a
broad scope of protection, as with fictional literature, rather than the
narrower scope of protection afforded factual texts.
Nevertheless, though neither fictional literature nor musical compo-
sitions are restricted in their expression by having to "stick to the facts,"
120. Id. at 950.
He must be a poor creature that does not often repeat himself. Imagine the author of
the excellent piece of advice, 'Know thyself', never alluding to that sentiment again
during the course of a protracted existence! Why, the truths a man carries about
with him are his tools; and do you think a carpenter is bound to use the same plane
but once to smooth a knotty board with, or to hang up his hammer after it has driven
its first nail? I shall never repeat a conversation, but an idea, often. I shall use the
same types when I like, but not commonly the same stereotypes. A thought is often
original, though you have uttered it a hundred times. It has come to you over a new
route, by a new and express train of associations.
Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 950 n.5, citing 0. W. HOLMES, THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAK-
FAST TABLE 9.
121. Warner Bro., 216 F.2d at 950. In Esquire, Vargas would have lost his entire liveli-
hood had he been denied the right to create paintings featuring women of exaggerated torso
and unduly long legs; certainly in Gross, the entire world was denied the artistic benefits of
"Cherry Ripe," the second photograph featuring the same nude model. Gross, 212 F. at 930.
122. Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 65.
123. Id.
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musical compositions are hampered by a restraint unknown to literary
works. Far fewer notes exist on the scale than do words in the English
language. Of these notes, only a small percentage of the available combi-
nations will produce anything which can justifiably be termed "music."
In Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 24 the court recognized that "while
there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the musical
notes of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the
infantile demands of the popular ear."'
' 25
Distinguishing between music that is "pleasing" and music "pleas-
ing to the popular ear" has validity. All composers have a more re-
stricted range of expression available to them than do fiction writers. But
the available range of musical expression is even narrower in the field of
popular, as opposed to classical, music.
In Selle v. Gibb,' 26 Dr. Arrand Parsons, a professor of classical mu-
sic at Northwestern University, testified as an expert witness for Ronald
Selle.' 27 Selle alleged that the hit tune by the Bee Gees, "How Deep Is
Your Love," had infringed the copyright to his own song, "Let It
End." ' 28 The court indicated that it would have given Dr. Parsons' testi-
mony more weight if he had been experienced in popular music. 29 Testi-
mony was required to analyze the complexity of the two popular
compositions so as to determine the standard of similarity needed to find
infringement 30 and the court recognized that popular songs are less
complex than classical compositions.'
3'
124. 113 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940).
125. Id at 80.
126. 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
127. Id. at 899.
128. Id. at 898.
129. Id. at 904.
The plaintiff relies almost entirely on the testimony of his expert witness, Dr. Arrand
Parsons. The defendants did not introduce any expert testimony, apparently because
they did not think Parsons' testimony needed to be refuted. Defendants are perhaps
to some degree correct in asserting that Parsons, although eminently qualified in the
field of classical music theory, was not equally qualified to analyze popular music
tunes.
Id.
130. Id. at 905. "To bolster the expert's conclusion that independent creation was not pos-
sible, there should be some testimony or other evidence of the relative complexity or unique-
ness of the two compositions. Dr. Parsons' testimony did not refer to this aspect of the
compositions." Id.
131. Id. "In a field such as that of popular music in which all songs are relatively short and





Selle acknowledged that the range of expression available to popular
composers is more restricted than to their classical colleagues. Because
of this it is both logically correct, and beneficial to popular composers,
for the courts to expressly recognize a narrowing of copyright protection
in popular music infringement cases, which would be similar to the nar-
rowed protection accorded factual/realist works as opposed to fictional/
abstract works. Otherwise, popular artists will eventually be foreclosed
from servicing the "infantile demands of the popular ear."' 32
Fortunately, John Fogerty succeeded in his defense against Fan-
tasy's infringement suit. The policy behind copyright law is to encourage
artists to use their talents for the benefit of the general public and to
reward them for their work. A contrary verdict in Fantasy would have
defeated this policy. The public would be denied the benefits of "Old
Man" and of possible future works from Fogerty. Instead, the public can
expect more songs in Fogerty's "swamp rock" style, just as Vargas' vic-
tory in Esquire resulted in the creation of additional "Varga Girls."
Ideas are outside the protection of copyright' 33 and so Fogerty was
always free to write about any subject matter he chose. But "Jungle's"
music constituted protectable expression. Fantasy accused Fogerty of
copying "Jungle's" music in "Old Man." Lacking direct evidence of
copying, the jury could infer copying if Fogerty had access to "Jungle"
and found substantial similarity between the two songs.
Ostensibly, the broader the scope of copyright protection, the
greater the benefit to authors. Yet, too broad a scope creates a situation
in which the first author to express an idea in a particular style would
gain a monopoly over that style.'34 And even the first author would be
prevented from reworking his old ideas in that style once the copyright to
the original work had been assigned. Had "Jungle" given Fogerty a
copyright monopoly over his "swamp rock" style, the style would have
been assigned away with "Jungle" if the jury had construed copyright
protection too broadly, just as the photographer in Gross assigned away
his right ever to create another photograph resembling his first.
No copyright protection is granted when, as in Morrissey, an idea
can only be expressed in a limited number of ways, nor, as in Schwarz,
when an expression necessarily flows from an unprotected idea. The pol-
132. Darrell, 113 F.2d at 80.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
134. Just as the plaintiff in Ricker unsuccessfully attempted to gain a monopoly over the
idea of expressing radio technology in simple language. Ricker, 162 F.2d at 142.
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icy is to narrow the scope of protection along with the available means of
expression. The narrower the scope of protection, the greater the degree
of similarity that is allowed to exist between "Jungle" and "Old Man"
without a finding of substantial similarity.
Limited available means of expression in factual works results in
narrowing the scope of protection accorded to the style used in such
works.' 35 Darrell and Selle recognize that popular music is an area of
limited available means of expression. Thus, the songwriting style of
"Jungle" was properly accorded the same narrow scope of protection as
the style used in factual works. Fogerty is free to write songs as similar
to "Jungle" as the second painting of the cardinal was to its predecessor
in Franklin Mint.
But if popular songs are more analogous to abstract rather than to
factual works, Esquire shows that abstract works (i.e. women with exag-
gerated torsos and unduly long legs) can still be accorded a narrow scope
of protection if they nevertheless reflect a limited available means of ex-
pression. In Esquire, the narrow scope of protection granted by the court
to the assigned paintings was due to Vargas' own limited style rather
than to any limitations inherent in his medium of choice (abstract art). If
rock music is construed as "abstract" by a court, Fogerty's own "swamp
rock" style might indicate that only a limited means of expression are
available to him, and "Jungle's" copyright should be narrowly construed
so as not to deprive Fogerty of a livelihood and the world of "Old Man."
The jury's feeling in Fantasy, that it is not possible for an author to
copy from himself, 136 suggests a new rule for the courts to consider. This
new rule need not permit an author to make outright duplicates of previ-
ously assigned works. It would only require the courts to consider, as a
valid factor during summary proceedings, that any author's work will
inevitably resemble his previous works because every author has his own
style. This additional factor might have decided Fantasy in Fogerty's
favor at the summary stage, avoiding an expensive and unnecessary law-
suit,137 while at the same time upholding the economic policy behind
135. Ricker, 162 F.2d 141; McMahon, 486 F. Supp. 1296; Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d 62.
136. Daily Variety, Nov. 8, 1988, supra note 25, at 18, col. 2. Whether two works are
similar is determined by asking whether they "carry the impression to ... an average person
who reads a scenario and sees a play, that they are the same. This is the criterion which the
courts have adopted." Schwarz, 85 F. Supp. at 274; "[I]t must be shown that copying went so
far as to constitute improper appropriation, the test being the response of the ordinary lay
person." Franklin Mint, 575 F.2d at 65. Thus, it would not be improper for the courts to
consider the "general feeling" of the jury in Fantasy III.
137. John Fogerty's victory cost over $400,000 in legal fees. In his contract with Warner





The new rule would be especially valuable to authors in the context
of today's entertainment industry, where the author and the eventual
owner of the copyright are usually two separate entities. The great
number of writers and composers attempting to break into the industry
has resulted in a "buyer's market," where producers use their unequal
bargaining power to set the terms of the sale, expecting the desperate
artist to be grateful that the producer has chosen to produce his work.
The problem for screenwriters began when they first came to
Hollywood to write for talking pictures. Film producers established the
precedent that, unlike the theater where playwrites grant mere licenses,
screenwriters would have to assign full copyright ownership of their
scripts to the studios.13 The situation is, if anything, worse for compos-
ers. Although the entertainment industry as a whole has a bad reputa-
tion for its financial practices, the music industry is particularly infamous
for its "creative accounting." '139 Once the copyright is assigned, the au-
thor is at the mercy of such accounting. Equity calls for a new rule
shielding authors from the deceitful practices prevalent in today's indus-
try."o Allowing authors greater freedom to rework their old ideas would
permit them to create new works, free from the grip of old contracts.
would defend any infringement suits at his own expense. Daily Variety, Nov. 8, 1988, supra
note 25, at 18, col. 1.
138. A. Gansberg, Writers Guild Of America: Writing History With 40 Years of Awards &
55 Years of Artistic Excellence, The Hollywood Reporter, Mar. 18, 1988, at S-2, col. 1.
139. D. Kagan, A Contractual Cacophony in Music, INSIGHT, July 4, 1988, at 50-52, (IN-
SIGHT is published by the Washington Times). Traditional industry practices by which record
companies avoid paying any royalty to artists include: (1) "Free goods," in which recording
companies give away records, tapes and compact discs for promotional purposes. Some of
these goods go to radio stations for free airtime and some go to retailers in the hope that free
records will generate added display space. However, sometimes record companies will give
away free copies of artist X's work in order to generate display space for artist Y. Artist X gets
neither royalties nor promotion for these giveaways of his or her work. Id at 51, col. 2;
(2) Recording companies have been accused of falsely claiming to have melted down unsold
records while secretly selling them for profit. Id. at 50, col. 1; (3) A "packaging deduction" is
taken when a recording company deducts 10% from the retail price for packaging, and thus
reducing the artist's royalty base by that amount. Id. at 52, col. 1; (4) A "studio advance" is
when a recording company "advances" an artist money for the cost of studio time to record
the master tape, and then deducts it from the artist's royalties. William Krasilovsky, a music
industry lawyer, terms this a "phony advance" because the artist never sees the money, and the
recording company withholds royalties from the artist long after the company has started
profiting from each unit sold. The practice is especially harmful to new artists who sign on for
very low royalty amounts. Id. at 52, col. 1.
140. See supra note 139.
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Congress was aware of the fact that many authors assigned their
copyrights for less than full value.' Legislative history shows that Con-
gress saw the problem as lying in "the unequal bargaining position of
authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's
value until it has been exploited."' 42 To help assure authors adequate
compensation, and thus support the policy of encouraging them to create
for the public good, Congress included a nonwaivable termination clause
in the Copyright Act of 1976.13 Any assignment of a copyright made
after January 1, 1978, can be terminated by the original author, notwith-
standing any agreement to the contrary. This clause reaffirms the policy
that authors deserve fair compensation for their works.'"
The scope of copyright protection is already narrow enough to allow
any author to re-explore an old idea or theme. Courts must recognize
that since there are a limited number of ways to express ideas, some au-
thors, either by choice or lack of ability, limit themselves to a certain
style of expression. Such judicial recognition would hold the doors of
creativity open to authors who have assigned a lucrative copyright, so
that they might re-enter old rooms to express different, albeit similar,
works.
Thomas M. Sipos
141. For instance, although Wes Craven is the creator of the original "Nightmare on Elm
Street" film, he only receives "minimal percentage points" from the series. He is currently
working on a competitor for Freddy ("Nightmare's" horrific star) which he hopes will result in
his first creation being "forced into retirement." A. King, Horror maven Wes Craven broadens
film, TVportfolio, The Hollywood Reporter, Aug. 26, 1988, at 6, col. 1.
142. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5740.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (1982). However, the author must wait thirty-five years from
the transfer of copyright before he or she can exercise this right. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1982).
Sensibly, Congress determined that the author's widow, widower and the surviving children
and grandchildren of the author, should also have some interest in the termination of transfer.
17 U.S.C. § 203(2) (1982).
144. Another change that would benefit composers and musicians would be recognition
that recording companies have a fiduciary relationship to artists, which would place a special
obligation of trust on them, as opposed to their relationship being a mere arms length business
agreement. Los Angeles attorney Don Engel has stated that he would "take the case for free,
just to go all the way to court and set the precedent." INSIGHT, supra note 139, at 52, col. 3.
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